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The Perpetual Adversary. How Dutch Security Services 
Perceived Communism (1918-1989) 
Constant Willem Hijzen ∗ 
Abstract: »Der ewige Gegner. Die Wahrnehmung des Kommunismus durch den 
Niederländischen Geheimdienst (1918-1989)«. For more than eighty years, 
Dutch security services perceived communism as the ultimate threat to nation-
al security. From its inception, the anticommunist threat perceptions contained 
references to foreign, possible, potential, and ideological elements of the com-
munist threat. This put the activities of Dutch communists in a different light. 
Although for a long time there were well-grounded reasons to do so, we find 
that there were periods when the actual threatening character of Dutch com-
munism decreased. However, the security services did not decrease their sur-
veillance activities vis-à-vis this ‘red menace’. To account for this discrepancy, 
we use insights from securitization theory, organizational studies, and intelli-
gence studies to deconstruct threat perceptions. We find that whenever actual-
ly threatening events, such as the revolutionary threat of 1918 or the World 
Wars, became part of a distant past, the security services emphasized the sym-
bolic and potential nature of the communist threat. The symbolic character of 
the threat, institutionalized and continually reinforced by processes of cogni-
tive bias, thus accounted for its unchanging threatening character. Only 
through external intervention have these perceptions changed. 
Keywords: security services, threat perceptions, securitization, communism, 
conspiracy, organization theory, cognitive closure. 
1.  Introduction 
“A cunning plot,” a former employee of the Dutch security service said, refer-
ring to the collapse of world communism in the early 1990s. He had dedicated 
his whole working life to opposing communism. Communists “were that 
smart.” The fall of communism therefore “certainly seemed to be a plot,” the 
former intelligence officer reasoned, because it benefited the communists in 
two ways. On the one hand, communists were now free to come to and move 
around in the West. They would have no problems bringing in weaponry. On 
the other hand, in the former, in the former communist countries in Central and 
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Eastern Europe, chaos would follow after the collapse of communism. So after 
a couple of years, still according to the former intelligence officer, people 
would start longing for communism again and then communists would be able 
to seize power again, this time supported by a veritable majority of the popula-
tion.1  
This view of communism would not have raised many eyebrows, say, fifty 
years earlier, when the Cold War started. But in 1998, when many of the for-
mer communist regimes had already successfully transformed into capitalist 
and democratic state systems and had exchanged their political elites corre-
spondingly, these words appeared to be somewhat outdated (Best, Gebauer and 
Salheiser 2012). However, the comment was not just an individual aberration; 
on an organizational level, anticommunist threat perceptions proved to be per-
sistent too. Even when other security issues such as student radicalism and 
international and domestic terrorism came to the fore, during the 1960s and 
1970s, and politicians and activist organizations pushed the security service to 
end its interference with domestic communist organizations, the leading cadre 
of the security service stuck to its anticommunist position. The service held that 
since the essence of communism did not change, „the policy of the security 
service remained unchanged.” Opposing this threat, the respective heads of 
service adamantly decided, should therefore be maintained as the cardinal 
responsibility of the security service.2 
How should we account for this unflinching belief in the threatening nature 
of communism? 
“Beginning from the known,” as one of the fundamentals of the intelligence 
profession prescribes, the historiography on Dutch intelligence and security 
paints us a picture of a security service unwilling or unable to change in princi-
ple. Keeping a certain distance to socio-political actors in the environment 
because of its secret character, the Dutch security service maintained its auton-
omy in determining threats too. In its own perception, the security service 
thought it was better equipped to assess the danger of communism than minis-
ters or members of parliament (De Valk 1996, 11, 44; Engelen 2007, 69-70, 
236). This observation helps us to grasp a very important contributing factor to 
the continuity in threat perceptions, i.e. organizational dynamics and logics, but 
                                                             
1  Interview with an anonymous former employee of Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst in a radio 
documentary, ‘Going back on track: serving the country’, VPRO radio documentary, broad-
cast 15th November 1998; Het Parool, 17. October 1998, ‘That good Cold War: interviews 
with six employees of the Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst’. 
2  E.g. Aurora meeting 3rd May 1965 [the so-called Aurora meetings were meetings between 
the head of the security service and his managers of the different departments, held two or 
three times a week to discuss current affairs]; Semi Static Archive of the Algemene Inlicht-
ingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, Report of meeting between head of the BVD and the minister 
of Interior Affairs, 8th June 1967 and 12th January 1982. 
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it fails to shed light on the question of why organizational logics dictate this 
particular outcome. 
In this article we argue that although the security services did perceive and 
analyze alterations within international and domestic communism, they were 
not able or willing to ‘desecuritize’ the communist threat. In this argument we 
will stress the importance of symbolic and organizational influences on the way 
threat perceptions evolved over time and argue that ‘desecuritization’ as an 
internal decision was not an option. Only external intervention could funda-
mentally alter these perceptions. 
1.1  Theoretical Orientation 
The specter of worldwide communism is pre-eminently associated with the 
realm of conspiracy theories. Conspiracies can be, as stated in the introduction 
to this HSR Special Issue by Beatrice de Graaf and Cornel Zwierlein, part of 
security and conspiracy ‘dispositives’. Dispositives, according to Michel Fou-
cault who coined the concept, are ‘heterogeneous ensembles’ of ‘discourses, 
institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative 
measures’ and many other things (De Graaf and Zwierlein 2013, in this HSR 
Special Issue). As the aim of this article is to understand the continuity in anti-
communist threat perceptions, it would stretch too far to look at all facets of a 
supposed anticommunist ‘security dispositive’, let alone a communist ‘conspir-
acy dispositive’ (De Graaf and Zwierlein 2013, in this HSR Special Issue; 
Balzacq 2011; Buzan, Waever and De Wilde 1998, 23). 
Instead we ask the question of why the Dutch security services considered 
communism to be a menace for such a long time, even though its character 
changed in important respects. To put it more precisely we ask which dimen-
sions of the communist threat changed over the years, why other aspects never 
changed at all, and why the security service for such a long period of time 
never decided to terminate the operational and analytical intelligence activities 
in communist circles. 
A possible answer to this question would be that communism was threaten-
ing all those years. Some authors follow this line of reasoning and emphasize 
the strong ties between Western communist parties and ‘Moscow’ (Guiat 2003, 
176). The communist parties’ mere existence thus justified authorities worrying 
and security services opposing the communist parties.3 Although we agree that 
in certain periods communism seemed to be a grave threat, we assume that 
nothing is essentially a menace. People interpret events, groups, and situations 
as threatening and construct representations of that threat (Balzacq 2011, 2; 
Hansen 2006, 25-8). To understand why communism was an enduring threat in 
                                                             
3  Right-wing politicians and thinkers in particular emphasized the continued threatening 
character of communist organizations, e.g. Frits Bolkestein (1998).  
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the eyes of Dutch security services over time, we have to understand the way 
these threat perceptions came about and how they altered throughout the dec-
ades of the twentieth century. 
To do this, we look at insights from securitization theory, organization theo-
ry, and intelligence studies. On the one hand, these theories offer insights in the 
genesis of security policies and the role of threat perceptions. In addition, they 
describe organizational mechanisms, which can help us find the causes for 
(resistance to) change in threat perceptions and security policies within the 
security services. On the other hand, these insights provide analytical tools to 
deconstruct the Dutch security services’ perceptions of communism, which we 
will use to operationalize these insights. Before we elaborate on the operation-
alization, we will briefly outline the different theoretical insights. 
The first of these is securitization theory, developed by the Copenhagen 
School. Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, and Jaap de Wilde, the proponents of this 
school, hold that issues in the security domain bear extraordinary importance 
and legitimate the use of extraordinary security measures. Issues are thus 
framed as security issues by (groups of) people, thus ‘making’ something “a 
security problem through discursive politics.” ‘Securitization’ is understood as 
“a set of interrelated practices, and the processes of their production, diffusion, 
and reception/translation that bring threats into being” (Waever 1996, 106; 
Balzacq 2011, 1-2). Although we do not look at all ‘interrelated practices’ and 
processes, we can translate the concept to the world of security services; a 
problem is ‘securitized’ when the security service considers it a concern requir-
ing its attention. ‘Desecuritization’, on the other hand, means that the securit-
ized issue is pushed back into the domain of normal politics (Roe 2004, 284). 
For the security service this meant that it would no longer consider the issue as 
threatening and therefore ended its activities to gather, analyze, and dissemi-
nate intelligence on the specific issue, group, or individual. 
 This approach to security affairs is fruitful in different ways. To begin with, 
it allows us to regard the security services’ threat perceptions as a construction, 
which actively ‘produced’, interpreted, translated, and disseminated. The secu-
rity services painted a picture of the nature and extent of specific threats. This 
practice consists of processes of interpretation, translation, and representation. 
In other words the security services label specific problems, developments, 
groups, and individuals as a threat to the democratic order or state security. 
Securitization theory enables us to look into the different aspects of this pro-
cess, introducing different analytical concepts, three of which we will use for 
operationalization (see below). 
Another fruitful perspective offered by the Copenhagen theorists is their 
emphasis on the symbolic character of the security domain. Central to the secu-
ritization argument is framing. A ‘securitizing’ actor uses all kinds of ‘heuristic 
artefacts’, such as image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, and emotions, in 
order to convince his audience that the issue at stake is indeed a matter of na-
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tional security (Balzacq 2011, 3). We interpret these artefacts as symbols. A 
symbol by definition refers to something other than itself, and aims to evoke 
certain attitudes, impressions, or events (Edelman 1964, 6). It can refer to mate-
rial things, in the sense that a national flag refers to ‘the country’ and a particu-
lar uniform refers to a certain group. But it can also refer to immaterial things 
such as ideas, norms, and values, which in turn can evoke fears, a sense of 
community, and other states of being. In this sense, government policies refer 
not only to their factual statements, but also to the norms and values that lie 
behind them (Korsten 2005, 8-9). 
The security domain is inherently symbolic. In the first place, intelligence 
and security services can be understood as symbols, since their sheer existence 
indicates that states care for their national security, that they believe an adver-
sary is present or can enter the stage, that his or her intentions are hostile, that 
something vital is at stake, and that a security service is capable of protecting 
the cherished values (cf. De Valk 1996, 25; Balzacq 2011, 15-8). 
Secondly, security services frame threats, adversaries, suspicious groups, 
political foes, and other vices in such a way that their activity or presence is 
part of a bigger picture: a possible (horrific) future, a detrimental state of af-
fairs, a potential catastrophe, conflict, or crisis. The mere presence of com-
munists invoked feelings of fear and aversion, because these individuals and 
organizations referred to something other than themselves, i.e. the possible 
violation of shared norms and beliefs, or the possible loss of what society val-
ues. To be more precise: since the Dutch communists, just like their counter-
parts all over the world, aimed at bringing down capitalism and establishing 
world socialism in its place, the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ demanded a 
worldwide revolution (Verrips 1995, 3-4).4 In the eyes of the Dutch security 
services, part of the political establishment, communist parties thus symbolized 
the possible breakdown of democratic order and the installation of a totalitarian 
regime. As long as communist parties held on to these goals, they posed a 
threat, which the security service sought to neutralize (Engelen 1995, 14; 2007, 
224; De Graaff and Wiebes 1994, 13-4). 
To understand how and why these perceptions were institutionalized over 
time, we rely, as a second theoretical orientation for this article, on insights 
from organization theory. Organization theorists are preoccupied with the 
question of how and why organizations and bureaucracies originate and devel-
op over time. They study all aspects of organizations, from their structural and 
cultural genesis to the interaction with actors in the institutional environment. 
The classical school of organization theory, based on the work of sociologist 
Max Weber, paid a lot of attention to bureaucratic organizations, assuming that 
bureaucratic organizations are characterized by a rational application of author-
                                                             
4  E.g. Centrale Inlichtingendienst, Year report B (leftist organizations) 1935. 
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ity, structure, and process. Organizations specialize and compartmentalize to 
become more efficient in their tasks. In more recent organization theory, it is 
assumed that because of this specializing and compartmentalizing, organiza-
tions cannot be considered as neutral, wholly rational constructions. Instead the 
people who set up or reorganize organizations structure organizations accord-
ing to their normative preferences and interests. Some lines of communication 
are possible, whilst others are not. Organization structure is, so to speak, agen-
da setting (Hastedt and Skelley 2009, 115-6). 
This applies to the Dutch security services in particular. Most of the Western 
states institutionalized their intelligence and security activities during the end 
of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, especially in the 
course of war or during international crises, to oppose an enemy. Essential 
activities of these apparatuses were to obtain knowledge about this opponent or 
enemy, being another individual, country, organization, or state (Moran 2011, 
48). Even in peace time, opposing a potential enemy became central to the 
existence of these services. That is why without such an opponent, the exist-
ence of these organizations would be very hard to justify and thus ‘the other’, a 
threat, or an adversary was of essential, not to say existential importance for 
security services. Communists suited the role of this ‘other’ eminently, because 
they stood for the exact opposite political, economic, social, and cultural norms 
and values the civil, religious, and predominantly conservative oriented mem-
bers and leaders of the security services embraced (Warner 2009, 16; De Valk 
1996, 8-12, 16; Hansen 2006, 19-20). 
A third theoretical insight which contributes to our understanding of the 
continuity in threat perceptions focuses on the internal processes of intelligence 
collection and analysis. It stems from the intelligence studies discipline and is 
called confirmation bias or cognitive closure. In studying intelligence failures 
like Pearl Harbour in 1941 and the attacks of 9/11, scholars point to different 
shortcomings in the intelligence cycle (the process with which agencies collect, 
analyze, report, and disseminate intelligence). One of these shortcomings is 
found on the level of the individual employee of an intelligence organization, 
and is cognitive-psychological in nature. It is called (confirmation) bias or 
‘cognitive closure’. This problem arises from the human mind, which is natu-
rally inclined to accept information only if it corresponds to existing infor-
mation (Johnston 2005, 20-1). This holds true not only for the brain, but for 
human behaviour in general: custom is the dominant guide of human life 
(Kuhns 2003, 89). It is also true for intelligence organizations as a whole. 
While they study threats which often comprise (parts of) whole societies which 
continually change, intelligence organizations are often large and bureaucratic 
organizations characterized by tradition. It is therefore inherently difficult to 
adapt to these changing threats (Hattlebrekke and Smith 2010, 180-1). 
To operationalize these theoretical insights we will again turn to the concept 
of securitization. The theory draws our attention to different elements of threat 
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perceptions and security policies: the referent subject, referent object, and the 
security measures or policies aimed at neutralizing the perceived threat. Firstly, 
the referent subject refers to the source of origin of the threat. Secondly, refer-
ent objects refer to things “that are seen to be existentially threatened and have 
a legitimate claim to survival.” In other words this is the perception of that 
which is at risk and is worth protecting. And by security measures, finally, we 
mean the policies or courses of action which are proposed to counter and neu-
tralize the perceived threat (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde 1998, 36; Balzacq 
2011, 1-3). 
In this paper, we will address the elements of and changes in these constitu-
tive elements of the security services’ perceptions of the communist specter in 
three different periods: between 1918 and 1940, between 1940 and 1960, and 
finally between 1960 and 1989. 
The first element pertains to the depiction of the revolutionary and com-
munist threat in terms of the referent subject. We will trace the security ser-
vices’ perceptions of the referent subject by looking at the nature of the threat. 
Who exactly was the alleged perpetrator? Were Dutch revolutionaries and 
communists acting as autonomous agents, only assisted by international fellows 
and comrades, or was Moscow behind all of it, and was some central agency 
using Dutch sister organizations as a fifth column, pulling them on a string like 
puppets? We also scrutinize what was deemed so threatening about their exist-
ence, their recent actions, or utterances and the concrete events or develop-
ments provoked these perceptions. In some instances the security service used 
very concrete and tangible descriptions, whilst in others it chose more abstract 
and intangible wordings. In some periods communists were more of an imme-
diate threat than in others, when the symbolic, potential character of the threat 
dominated. This was related to the spatial dimension of the referent subject, 
which varied from a global scope of the adversary, when the security services 
emphasized the communists’ aspirations for world revolution, to a European, 
national, regional, or even local range of the communist adversary. Some 
threats, the security services noted, were international in nature, but gravitated 
for example towards Amsterdam. In other cases they even evolved around a 
specific individual.5 
Secondly, we will analyze the threat perception of the services in terms of a 
referent object, the supposed target of the threat (Balzacq 2011, 3). Here we 
look at the scope of that which was perceived to be in danger, ranging from the 
government as a whole to democracy, the democratic order, social order, or 
even freedom in general. In these depictions we look at the images, analogies, 
or metaphors the security services used to describe what was at stake (cf. De 
Graaf 2011, 130-1). Although these depictions changed over time, we have to 
                                                             
5  E.g. Centrale Inlichtingendienst, Report number 06632, 24th November 1933. 
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be aware that the main foundation of the services was in fact the defense of the 
democratic order and state security. So in the eyes of the security services the 
referent object of the communist threat was clear; if something was a concern 
of the security service, then the democratic order or state security was at stake. 
The wordings and images used to describe what was being threatened, howev-
er, did change in the course of the century.6 
Thirdly, we will look at the response of the security service to these (chang-
ing) threat perceptions. In relation to these threat perceptions, we will ask 
whether the security service found it necessary to adjust its repertoires of ac-
tion. Were operational activities decreased or increased? Was the proposed 
action related to the organizational structure or cognitive bias? Did the security 
service formulate explicit reasons to improve the intelligence position on the 
communist adversary? In intelligence terms, this could imply a scaling up to 
more far-reaching intelligence methods, for example from open source intelli-
gence (OSINT), in the form of reading papers, publications, and other publicly 
available writings, to the use of informants and agents in an object organization 
(human intelligence; HUMINT) or microphones and telephone tapes, which is 
called signals intelligence (SIGINT) (O’Connell 2004, 189-99).7 Another pos-
sibility was that the security service expanded its action repertoires, for exam-
ple by introducing new methods or strategies. We also address the question of 
how new informational, communicational, and technological techniques in-
formed these stages of securitization (Balzacq 2011, 3, 7; De Graaf and Zwier-
lein 2013, in this HSR Special Issue). Finally, we will also gauge the socio-
psychological dynamics of these responses: were they related to the processes 
of ‘cognitive closure’ and organizational developments we described above? 
2.  Revolutionary Turbulence (1918-1940) 
2.1  Fright of the Revolution – The Referent Subject 
Socialism originated in the nineteenth century. Radical thinkers like Pierre 
Joseph Proudhon inspired middle and working class people around the world to 
aspire for a more egalitarian society. In the Netherlands, several radical social-
                                                             
6  National Archive, The Hague, Archive of the Ministries for General Warfare of the Realm 
and General Affairs, and the Cabinet of the Prime Minister, entry 2.03.01, inventory number 
6911, Letter from the coordinator of the intelligence and security services F. Kist to prime 
minister Drees, 21 January 1957; Semi Static Archive of the Algemene Inlichtingen- en 
Veiligheidsdienst, Report of meeting between head of the BVD and the minister of Interior 
Affairs, 8th June 1967; Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst, Monthly overview December 1959. 
7  E.g. Semi Static Archive of the Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, Report of 
meeting between head of the BVD and the minister of Interior Affairs, 8th June 1967. 
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ist parties were formed in the second half of the nineteenth century. Although 
the labor movement established the Social Democratic Workers’ Party (Soci-
aal-Democratische Arbeiderspartij, SDAP) in 1894, which preferred to operate 
within the boundaries dictated by parliamentary democracy, radical socialism 
survived. The radicals interpreted socialism in a much stricter sense than their 
SDAP counterparts, advocating the unchaining of a revolution which would 
end world capitalism and turn the means of production into the hands of the 
proletariat. Whilst radical socialist parties, such as the Social Democratic Party 
(SDP), initially only acquired the support of a few hundred members, member-
ship doubled during the revolutionary unrest in Russia and Germany at the end 
of the First World War (De Rooij 2005, 113-45; Verrips 1995, 3). 
Authorities started to worry when in fall 1917 the leader of the Bolshevik 
faction of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 
seized power in Russia. In the Netherlands a harsh winter and deplorable eco-
nomic conditions were expected, so the head of the Amsterdam police T. M. 
Roest van Limburg told his inspector K.H. Broekhoff to pay special attention to 
“phenomena pointing at revolutionary movements” (De Graaff 1997, 98). 
Whilst some radical socialists mobilized soldiers and workers to form councils, 
which could help overtake state power just as the Bolsheviks had done in Rus-
sia, revolution still seemed far away (Engelen 2000, 33-4). The end of the First 
World War in November 1918 brought revolution closer to home: in the face of 
coming defeat in the war, revolutionary violence broke out in various places in 
Germany. This led the Dutch authorities to fear that this “revolutionary stream 
would inexorably come westward,” to the Netherlands.8 
Then, on 12th November, the external political threat manifested itself in 
domestic appeals for revolution. In parliament one of the founders of the social 
democratic party, representative and party leader Pieter Jelles Troelstra called 
on the government to abdicate and on the workers to assume the right to govern 
themselves (Wijne 1999, 8-12). Although there were no widespread disturb-
ances, in some cities the revolution was seemingly gaining momentum. The 
day after Troelstra had spoken before parliament, the Amsterdam-based radical 
socialist David Wijnkoop called his audience to arms during a speech in order 
to liberate one of their comrades from the military barracks where he was held 
(Kaal 2008, 23-4). In Maastricht and Heerlen, revolutionary unrest erupted as 
well. In Aken, just over the border, “thousands of Spartacists” (German revolu-
tionaries) were standing by, ready to take their revolution beyond the border, 
authorities feared (De Graaff 2007, 53-4).9 A.R. Zimmerman, the mayor of 
Rotterdam, had heard rumors of the revolutionary agitation and feared that 
revolutionary chaos was about to break loose. In response Zimmerman invited 
                                                             
8  National Archive, The Hague, Archive of the Ministry of Finance, entry 2.08.41, inventory 
number 1390. 
9  Centrale Inlichtingendienst, Report number 01319, 31st May 1919. 
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the leaders of the local department of the socialist SDAP party in Rotterdam to 
the city hall, allegedly to discuss a possible peaceful transition to socialism 
(Bosmans 1979). 
The events of November 1918 were perceived as a twofold threat. The revo-
lutionaries in Germany posed the first and most alarming threat. Although the 
worst unrest in Germany was subdued in the ensuing months, the so-called 
Spartacists posed a continuing threat. The military intelligence and security 
service GS III, and from 1919 on the Central Intelligence Service (the first 
Dutch security service), consequently kept reporting rumors of Spartacists 
planning to bring revolution to the Netherlands. Military messengers and units 
policing the eastern Dutch borders dispatched alarming reports to The Hague, 
warning that the government should “prepare for the worst.”10 When on 11th 
January 1923 a French-Belgian military operation started to occupy the Ruhr 
area in western Germany, security services again ventilated fear of revolution-
ary agitation. Only when the troops retreated two years later did the “spill-over 
threat” start to wane (Fischer 2003, 290-3). 
The other element constituting the referent object of this revolutionary threat 
was of a domestic nature. To ascertain whether the revolutionary unrest would 
really spill over into the Netherlands, the central and local governments needed 
information on the intentions, activities, and possible supporters of the revolu-
tion such as extreme leftist parties and their members. How would these radical 
socialists react to the agitation across the eastern border? From this moment on, 
the security service systematically collected intelligence on the communist 
parties, revolutionary socialist organizations, anarchists, free thinkers, pacifists, 
left-wing religious groups, and even on the obscure movement of the Esperan-
tists. Citizens maintaining contacts with revolutionaries abroad were consid-
ered a threat as well (De Graaff 1997, 102; Hijzen 2012). 
Whilst the external referent subject faded away, the domestic component of 
the threat retained its threatening character in the perception of the services and 
their political masters. The Dutch revolutionaries did in fact take their orders 
from an organization which determined the policies for communist parties 
worldwide: the Komintern. In 1919 the Third Communist International had 
decided that communists worldwide should fight, if necessary with arms, for 
the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie (Hallas 2008, 10-25). The per-
ceived threat of the revolutionaries and communists thus retained an acute 
character in the years following the ‘November 18 events’.11 
As time progressed however and the revolutionary events at the end of the 
First World War became part of an increasingly distant past, the depictions of 
the domestic revolutionary adversary seemed to shift as well. To be sure, noth-
                                                             
10  Centrale Inlichtingendienst, Report number 03334, 22nd March 1920.  
11  Centrale Inlichtingendienst, Concise overview of the general situation number 16, 16th 
October 1920. 
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ing changed in the goals of the Dutch communists: they still adhered to the 
ideal of a global revolution. But the urgency of the threat, in the mode of a 
November 1918 take-over scenario, seemed to disappear. The CI observed that 
things were ‘relatively peaceful’ in communist circles. As a consequence, it 
increasingly depicted the communist and revolutionary adversary in abstract 
terms. At a meeting with the police chiefs in 1928 the head of the security 
service, T.S. Rooseboom, spoke about ‘Moscow’ carrying out “very systematic 
actions to undermine all instruments of authority.” And in later years, reports 
disseminated by the Central Intelligence Service spoke of ‘revolutionary possi-
bilities’ and ‘agitation’.12 Communism was, in Rooseboom’s words, foremost a 
“doctrine of subversion, by all conceivable means and in an almost scientific 
manner.” The communists improved their art of subversion to such a high level 
of perfection, the security service reported, that even the leader of the national 
socialist party in Germany, Adolf Hitler, used ‘communist techniques’ in sub-
verting legitimate state power.13 
Notwithstanding this general threat assessment, on different occasions, the 
security service observed that the Communist Party of Holland had ceased to 
cause any agitation. In fact, the revolutionaries were losing terrain. By the end 
of 1928 the Central Intelligence Service noted that lately “communist party life 
was not very cheerful.” The number of active supporters declined.14 Where 
communism was on the wane and showed signs of ‘slackness’, new totalitarian 
and radical ideologies such as fascism and Nazism were gaining ground, the 
service observed somewhat uneasily. By 1933 the “communist party here in the 
Netherlands only stood a chance in intellectual circles,” the security service 
reported.15 And so the mass proportions of the communist threat decreased very 
clearly. The CI concluded in 1934 that the communist parties “were no longer 
the hazardous factor they were before.”16 
2.2  Order, Peace, and Authority at Risk – The Referent Object 
What then was actually threatened by this red menace, what was at stake? 
According to the Dutch security service the revolutionary turbulence was a 
multifaceted threat, directed at a variety of objects. 
In the November days of 1918 the first object of the communist threat ap-
peared to be the military. If soldiers were susceptible to the revolutionary rhet-
oric, their allegiance to the fatherland was no longer guaranteed. When even in 
obscure provincial towns such as Kwadijk and Purmerend proper ‘councils of 
                                                             
12  Centrale Inlichtingendienst, Report number 17651, 27th March 1928; Centrale Inlicht-
ingendienst, Year reports B (leftist organizations) 1934, 1936, 1938. 
13  Centrale Inlichtingendienst, Report number 23939, 21st November 1930. 
14  Centrale Inlichtingendienst, Overview report number 4, 1928.  
15  Centrale Inlichtingendienst, Report number 06632, 24th November 1933. 
16  Centrale Inlichtingendienst, Report number 15449, 23rd November 1934. 
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workers and soldiers’ were established, similar to the ones in Kiel or Petrograd 
(Saint Petersburg), subversion of the army from within became a real possibil-
ity, in the eyes of the military leadership (Blom and Stelling, 855-78; Engelen 
2002, 384). For a state to preserve its power, it depends on the army. When 
called upon, soldiers had to be loyal, obeying the orders of the queen and fa-
therland, not those of the insurgents.  
In response to this threat from within, army officers established a ‘league of 
loyalists’.17 Consequently, the military intelligence and security service GS III 
was instructed to monitor whether revolutionary texts or propaganda materials 
circulated within its ranks, and screened new recruits for their possible mem-
bership of revolutionary organizations. Commanders of the troops were ordered 
to notify the security service about any socialist activity within their ranks. 
Soldiers’ complaints about deplorable clothing, shelter, or nourishment were 
from then on interpreted as acts of subversion: “whenever they kept complain-
ing about the miserable food” or “deliberately provoked complaints in other 
ways,” they were immediately suspected or accused of fueling revolutionary 
sentiments.18 
A second vulnerability to this communist threat was located in the domain 
of public order, peace and authority. Despite the disquieting days of November 
1918, however, the cabinet of Ruijs de Beerenbrouck as a whole was not con-
vinced of the likelihood of a communist takeover. It did not fear that revolu-
tionaries anywhere in the country had concrete plans or the capabilities to over-
throw government or the democratic system as a whole. Only in Rotterdam did 
the SDAP manage to mobilize a substantial number of workers, thereby upset-
ting the public order and social peace, but in the rest of the country all was 
quiet (De Valk and Kappelhof, 85-6). Already on 13th November 1918, Ruijs 
de Beerenbrouck was informed by the military leadership that Pieter Jelles 
Troelstra, who had held his direful speech in parliament the day before, had 
withdrawn his statements and admitted his mistake. The General Staff of the 
Dutch army knew about Troelstra’s pull back in advance, through military 
phone tapping, which supposedly put political worries at ease early on 
(Engelen 2002, 35-7). 
The events had shown nonetheless that there was potential for revolutionary 
unrest or agitation. To reassure the people and soothe potential future rebellion 
in Dutch society, the cabinet of Ruijs de Beerenbrouck addressed the Dutch 
people in a proclamation, compiled in the night after Troelstra had held his 
speech. The proclamation was printed in every newspaper and placarded 
throughout the country; it stated that “in the interest of the rights and freedoms 
                                                             
17  National Archive, The Hague, Archive of the Commander of the Military Position Hollands 
Diep and the Volkerak 1812-1922, entry 3.09.25, inventory number 218. 
18  Centrale Inlichtingendienst, Report number 17651, 27th March 1928. 
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of the entire people” the government had decided to maintain “peace and or-
der” (Wijne 1999, 29). 
Instead of explicitly blaming the extreme left for the turmoil, the govern-
ment consciously chose to emphasize peace, order, and authority. In so doing, 
the prime minister refrained from estranging the working class. By introducing 
different policies aimed at supporting the social and economic conditions of the 
workers’ class and explicitly meeting socialist demands such as female suf-
frage, the government encapsulated the workers, thereby neutralizing possible 
future support for revolutionary appeals (Wijne 1999, 29-30). The majority of 
the political and administrative elite were truly convinced that it was not the 
marginal activities of socialists but public disorder in itself that was the real 
threat. In their eyes ‘the people’ or society at large would be lost without a 
proper working government in place. The Rotterdam Burgomaster, Zimmer-
man, was a good example of this fear: in response to the critique regarding his 
position in November 1918, he underlined that his major concern had not been 
the communists, but the ‘phenomena of dissolution’ as such. He had merely 
tried to ‘calm the excitement’, and still considered it his most important task to 
provide the people of Rotterdam with order and peace.19 
2.3  Establishing the Security Service – The Response 
The communist threat triggered the establishment of the first security service in 
the Netherlands. In 1918 the security service still had to be invented. During 
the November days of 1918, the military secret service GS III had performed 
domestic intelligence tasks (Engelen 2002, 35). One of the reasons for the fact 
that H.A.C. Fabius, head of GS III, was so well informed was that the Amster-
dam police chief sent him lists with the names of revolutionaries and the mem-
bers of revolutionary organizations in his city. His policemen visited political 
meetings of radical parties regularly, learning what these organizations were up 
to and writing down their names. Herewith the police constructed an increas-
ingly complete picture of the membership of radical parties in their cities. 
Through these city reports, a national intelligence estimate on the revolutionary 
threat in the country as a whole could be constructed. This is exactly what 
Fabius suggested: to establish a civilian agency that could assemble such gen-
eral intelligence on a regular basis (Kluiters 1993, 182). 
Fabius’ plans were received rather dispassionately. The police chiefs were 
reluctant to hand over information (and power) to a national, central security 
unit; and the minister of the interior and prime minister Ruijs de Beerenbrouck, 
who would have to carry the political and financial responsibility for the ser-
vice, was not convinced of its value as such. He refused to spend money on the 
security service. After some deliberations, it was decided that the minister of 
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warfare would pay the bills, while the political responsibility was consigned to 
the minister of the interior. It was a civilian security service after all. So, in 
1919 the Central Intelligence Service (Centrale Inlichtingendienst, abbreviated 
as CI) was established. The service was of a small scale, operating under mili-
tary wings, and relying heavily on the intelligence the municipal police gath-
ered (Engelen 2002, 29-30). 
Over the years, the CI collected intelligence on different kinds of threats, 
e.g. pacifism and from the second half of the 1930s on fascist and national 
socialist parties too. But from its inception, the most important object of atten-
tion was the political organizations of the labor movement and its extreme 
fringes. Based mainly on the police reports, the security service assembled 
extensive knowledge on the membership of Dutch social and political organiza-
tions on the extreme left, such as the Trotskyists, socialists, Bolsheviks, and 
communists (Hijzen 2012, 335-40). This knowledge became aggregated in 
different kinds of intelligence products, such as two weekly reports, yearly 
reports and the so-called black lists. These lists contained the names of all 
Dutch and international revolutionaries, and included comments on their ‘sta-
tus’ as well. One was depicted as ‘a dangerous communist’, another as ‘a revo-
lutionary propagandist’ and a third was described as offering logistical support 
to revolutionaries.20 
2.4   No Longer the Hazardous Factor of Before – Concluding 
 Remarks 
When in November 1918 revolution broke out in Germany, the Dutch political 
establishment feared that similar developments could take place in their coun-
try as well. When Troelstra called for revolution at home too, some local politi-
cians feared that revolution was about to break out. This established the sym-
bolic character of Dutch socialist parties; the revolutionaries aspired to subvert 
public and political order, which was something the civil, confessional, and 
conservative middle class and political elite held in high esteem. Apart from an 
antirevolutionary law, the political elite did not take much action against this 
threat. The security service, established in 1919, was the one and only organi-
zation directed at monitoring this new threat. The small-scale service, granted  
with a limited budget, mainly collected police reports to do so. The threat was 
not publicly securitized or heavily politicized, which would have made the 
communist threat the center of political attention and an object of broader secu-
rity policies. What was at stake, in the perception of politicians and the security 
service alike, was public order, peace, and authority and the threat of a popula-
tion running wild on unrestrained instincts. 
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Until late in the 1920s the memory of November 1918 was enough to legit-
imize the continued attention towards left extremist political life. But when the 
years passed, and November 1918 became a more distant memory, the security 
service started framing the threat in more abstract terms. The threat trans-
formed from an actual threat to a potential one. Revolutionary agitation was 
still a possible scenario, but it became a less likely one. In the words of the 
head of the security service T.S. Rooseboom, communism was showing signs 
of ‘slackness’. It was no longer as hazardous as before. 
3.  Communists as the Next Oppressors (1940-1960) 
3.1   The Creation of the Communist Fifth Column – Referent 
 Subject 
Then on 10th May 1940 everything changed. The German army invaded the 
Netherlands and after six days the military surrendered, while the Dutch gov-
ernment fled to London and parliament was suspended. The officers of the 
Central Intelligence Service took their refuge in London as well, thereby dis-
solving the existing intelligence infrastructure in the Netherlands. When on 
29th May 1940 Reichskommissar Arthur Seyss-Inquart was installed as the 
highest authority in the Netherlands, Dutch sovereignty ceased to exist. In 
London Wilhelmina led the Dutch government to choose the side of the Allied 
Forces in the war. By opting for the Allied side, in the hope of regaining its 
sovereignty, the Dutch government became dependent upon Allied successes in 
the war and their strategies for the restoration of international security 
(Posthumus Meyjes 1958, 88; De Jong 1979, 75-6; Engelen 2002 47-8). 
For the Dutch government the communists lost their priority to the national 
socialist regime as the most comprehensive threat. Social democrats had more-
over assumed ministerial seats under the De Geer cabinet in 1939, so the per-
ceived distance between the social democrats on the one side and the confes-
sional and liberal conservative parties on the other had diminished. 
Communists were very active in the resistance, centralizing their resistance 
activities in the nationally organized ‘Council of Resistance’ in 1943. Their 
important role in the resistance gave the communists a lot of goodwill and 
credibility amongst the population. Communists underwent a transformation 
from being the enemy into representing a staunch ally in the resistance move-
ments that sprang up all over the Netherlands (De Jong 1975, 161-5; Verrips 
1995, 138-73). 
However, this apparent political truce in opposition towards the German ag-
gressor was riven by a continued suspicion of communists. The intelligence 
and security agencies, established by the Dutch government in exile between 
1940 and 1942, observed that different resistance groups were deeply divided 
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along religious and ideological lines. The Bureau of Intelligence, created on 
28th November 1942, observed for example that communist and socialist 
groups refused to cooperate.21 The orthodox protestant Landelijke Knokploegen 
(National Fighting Squads) and the Landelijke Organisatie van Onderduikers 
(National Organization of Refugees), for example, deeply mistrusted the com-
munists belonging to the Council of Resistance (De Jong 1976, 983). 
Fear of communism resurfaced in government circles, when in 1943 after 
two years of heavy fighting the war finally seemed to take a positive turn for 
the Allies. As the prospect of winning and ending the war was discussed during 
the cabinet meetings, the Dutch government decided to materialize its contin-
gency planning for the ‘transitional period’; the vacuum of power between the 
departing German government and the return of the Dutch authorities (Beyens 
2009, 108-109). The cabinet feared that in the face of a power vacuum, public 
order and social peace could not be upheld. On the one hand the cabinet in 
London feared civilians taking the matter into their own hands by executing 
alleged collaborators, and on the other they saw once again the specter of a 
communist takeover. The Gerbrandy cabinet hence took security measures to 
prevent a “repetition of November 18” from happening (De Jong 1979, 1352-
3). 
Many prominent members of the resistance shared these fears. While the 
end of the war was approaching, non-communist resistance groups started to 
worry about what all these armed and well organized communists would do 
after the war. Would they hand over their weaponry to the competent authori-
ty? Or were they planning on keeping the weapons to seize power, capitalizing 
on the transitional period between the defeat of the Germans and the return of 
the Dutch government? When news arrived on a thwarted Belgium coup d’état 
in November 1944, many resistance fighters became alert for communists 
trying to stage their revolution at the end of the war (Beyens 2009, 107-8). 
Although these fears did not materialize, they survived far into the postwar 
period. Between September 1944, when the South of the Netherlands was 
liberated, and 5th May 1945 when the rest of the country was freed as well, no 
communist agitation took place, nor in the months thereafter. Fears that it 
might happen in the future nevertheless found their way into the first postwar 
security service, the Bureau of National Security, established on 29th May 
1945. Many of the employees of this service were former resistance fighters 
(Engelen 2007, 26-7). In January 1946, the Bureau of National Security report-
ed a large number of non-authorized weapons within Dutch society, a state of 
affairs the service thought profoundly ‘alarming’. In addition, rumor spread 
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that the communist party, quickly resurrected after the war, planned to establish 
a ‘communist secret service’.22  
Therefore as soon as 1946, the security service concluded that communism 
was the central threat in the postwar world – again (Hofland 1972, 144; Witte 
1989, 38).23 This priority was informed first of all by the conservative, reli-
gious, and resistance background of the intelligence officers. Most of them 
were highly motivated to defend their fatherland as they had done during the 
war, only now from another totalitarian regime: the Soviet Union. Secondly, 
the war played a crucial role in transforming the resurfacing communist threat 
into a much more menacing phenomenon. In 1946, communism appeared to 
become a mass-based threat again when in the first postwar elections ten per-
cent of the Dutch electorate voted for the Communist Party of the Nether-
lands.24 And it could be assumed that many more people were passively sup-
porting the communists because of their resistance efforts, and due to the role 
of the Red Army in fighting the Nazis.25 Moreover, the potentiality that charac-
terized the prewar communist threat, had obtained an alarming actuality during 
the war. The German national socialist regime had demonstrated how quickly a 
totalitarian party could gain power, and how devastating the consequences 
were. In a way, the communist threat obtained national socialist and German 
traits. 
This transformation and expansion of the communist threat perception was 
reflected in an external and internal element of the referent subject of the threat. 
The external threat consisted of the possibility of a military attack by the Soviet 
Union. The communist takeovers in Eastern and Central Europe had demon-
strated that Stalin was no less expansive in his ambitions than Hitler had been 
(Palmer 2007, 871; Van der Boom 2001, 33). The internal element of the 
communist fear related to the allegiance of members of Dutch communist 
parties to Moscow. They had never renounced their dreams of world revolution 
and they still took orders directly from Moscow. The communist coup in 
Czechoslovakia in February 1948 underscored this fear (De Graaff 1997, 56; 
De Liagre Böhl 1982, 18). Although the coup did not lead Dutch authorities to 
believe that Dutch communists were capable of a similar operation, the security 
service did report an exultant mood in communist circles. Communists publicly 
                                                             
22  National Archive, The Hague, Archive of Bureau Nationale Veiligheid, entry 2.04.80, inven-
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HSR 38 (2013) 1  │  183 
claimed that the Russians ‘were closer than ever’ and that revolution was inevi-
tably coming to the Netherlands as well.26 
From this point on, the Dutch communists were considered a ‘fifth column’. 
The fifth column image stemmed from the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), and 
referred to a ‘class of insurgents’ within the city walls or in this case national 
boundaries; a large number of agents, secretly helping the enemy outside the 
gates or borders by spying and sabotaging, in order to undermine the defense 
capabilities of the state. Although this specter of a centralized and well orga-
nized group, directed by a foreign power and capable of anything was a phan-
tom, the Dutch public anxiously supposed it was very real (De Jong 1953, 3-4). 
The same happened to the communists. A military counterpart of the civil-
ian security service described Dutch communists as “a more or less centrally 
organized group of party members, performing all kinds of services for the 
future enemy, which in addition will fight shoulder to shoulder with the invad-
ing enemy columns, as soon as the moment of overt struggle has come.”27 
This ‘fifth column’ image connected the internal and external communist 
threat perceptions and moreover gave them a military character. Dutch com-
munists were considered as actual spies and saboteurs for Stalin.28 Where the 
CPSU had exerted influence through the Komintern before the war as well, it 
now seemed to direct the Dutch communists to help prepare for a direct and 
military attack on the West. The first head of the Binnenlandse Veilig-
heidsdienst Louis Einthoven considered the Dutch communists to be in the 
frontlines of that offensive. Although Dutch communists had not yet proven to 
pose a serious threat to law and order, “the threat was creeping in.” The gov-
ernment should be “cautious for the relentless subverting activities common in 
communist circles.” Communists seized every opportunity to “test the solidity 
of the existing polity and profit politically from possible critical situations.”29 
In the eyes of Louis Einthoven and his organization, communism had thus 
become “a gigantic threat.” It had adopted dimensions it did not have before 
the war and that had made communism a more massive, acute, and existentially 
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threatening phenomenon than ever before. Communism, in Einthoven’s words, 
was inherently prone to strive for world domination. It “recoiled from nothing” 
and “had an endless amount of resources.”30 
3.2   Western Democracies at Risk – The Referent Object 
Due to the Second World War the referent object of this perceived threat 
changed as well. From an abstract threat to public order, social peace, and 
political authority, communism regained its ‘November 18 traits’. From 1943 
onwards, as we have described in the previous paragraph, the Dutch govern-
ment and prominent resistance members feared that communists might seize 
the opportunity during the transitional period immediately following the war. 
Just as Zimmerman had expressed his fear that the absence of a disciplining 
authority might unleash primitive passions among the population, now the 
Military Authority, responsible for upholding order and state power during this 
period, assumed that a licentious population was indeed difficult to restrain 
again. This might even lead to bloodbaths. Communists knew this too, the 
military reasoned. Hence “this too was a welcome instance for inauspicious or 
extremist elements to strike a blow” (cited in Witte 1990, 39-40). 
In the months following the defeat of Germany, the fears of large-scale agi-
tation and violence among the Dutch population did not materialize. Com-
munism nevertheless continued to haunt the security services for the decades to 
come, only now for different reasons and with different effects. Until the 1960s 
two major changes occurred in the referent object of the communist threat. 
In the first place, the referent object of the domestic communist threat shift-
ed from the idea of a rampaging population combined with communists seizing 
power, to a more concrete and short-term threat. As indicated above, the be-
nevolent attitude of a large proportion of the Dutch population and the com-
munists’ victory in the elections of 1946 troubled officials and politicians alike. 
Leaders of the confessional workers’ unions feared that ‘their’ workers would 
desert to communist unions, and church leaders considered the antireligious 
communists to be a major threat to Christianity (Koedijk 1997, 57). Although 
the cabinet of Louis Beel did not want to take radical security measures – in-
stead it believed that economic recovery was the key to depriving communism 
of its matrix – the security services geared up to combat communism (De Li-
agre Böhl 2003, 214-29). 
Einthoven identified three arenas in which communists would launch their 
subversive activities. The first was the political arena. As ordered by the com-
munist international, reestablished in 1947 as the Kominform, the Communist 
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Party of the Netherlands tried to win votes (Havenaar 1993, 69; Hogan 1997, 
17). In order to secure the normal functioning of the democratic order and to 
prevent the Soviet Union from gaining influence, the security service therefore 
tried to monitor and neutralize the different tactics the communists applied to 
strive for political influence. These tactics changed over the years. By the end 
of the 1950s the security service observed that the communist party had aban-
doned its attempts to grow electorally. Instead Moscow instructed them to 
“infiltrate nationalist parties, in such a way that they implement policies which 
are consistent with Moscow’s requirements.”31 
The second object of communist infiltrations was the economy. When, for 
example, in September 1948 communist unions called their members to go on 
strike, the intelligence analysts of the security service concluded that they only 
did this to “disrupt the economic equilibrium.” Communists hoped to destabi-
lize the political and economic order. Calling for strikes was part of this strate-
gy to cause ‘agitation’.32 Therefore the security service structurally gathered 
intelligence on the communist involvement in the workers’ movement. Infiltra-
tion in ‘bona fide’, i.e. noncommunist workers’ unions appeared to be an im-
portant strategy in the economic sphere as well.33 
The third locus of communist activities was the most tangible one: the gov-
ernment apparatus. One of the most important tasks of the postwar security 
services was to protect vulnerable positions in bureaucracy and access to confi-
dential political and military information (Koedijk 2010, 295-300). On the one 
hand, this meant that the security service advised and trained employees of 
government agencies to secure their buildings, confidential policy documents, 
rooms, their gates, et cetera. On the other hand, the service carried out vetting 
requests and inquiries into the political background of applicants to a position 
within government agencies and private firms carrying out work commissioned 
by the ministry of Defense (Engelen 1995, 107-9). 
The second change in the referent object against which the communist threat 
was purportedly directed, was its increasing ideological and international fram-
ing. To be more precise: whereas before the war communism was framed as 
threatening public order and social peace, in Einthoven’s days the security 
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service explicitly indicated that the communists were undermining the domes-
tic and international order as such and aimed to install a communist dictator-
ship. Both the referent subject and its object had assumed totalitarian propor-
tions, according to the service. Nothing less than national sovereignty and 
democratic liberty were at stake. 
Not only on a national scale, but on an international plane as well. In 1948 
the Netherlands co-founded the Western European Union, a military alliance 
between the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, and France. And in April 1949 
the Dutch joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO. This military 
alliance was led by the United States. For the Netherlands, becoming a member 
implied alignment with the US (Hellema 2001, 148-52; De Liagre Böhl 2003, 
220-222). National security had now in fact become international security, 
because the Western states agreed that an attack on one of the member states 
was to be perceived as an attack on them all. The Binnenlandse 
Veiligheidsdienst was appointed as the national security authority in 1949, 
responsible for securing the governmental and military apparatus within a 
European and Transatlantic context (De Geus 1998, 61-3). 
From this moment on, the security service increasingly interpreted the activ-
ities of the Communist Party of the Netherlands in this international context. 
Their activities were not only threatening to the Dutch democratic system, but 
to that of all member states. Dutch communists were therefore seen as “a con-
stant threat” to “Western countries, Western democratic society, and Western 
culture.”34 
3.3   Defensive and Offensive Intelligence Techniques – The Response 
These enhanced dimensions of the communist threat legitimized a whole range 
of new security measures. The Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst became incom-
parably larger, more professional, and offensive than its predecessors had ever 
been. We will trace these changes along two paths: one institutional, the other 
technical and methodical.  
During the war, successor organizations to the Centrale Inlichtingendienst 
were established under British auspices. The British trained recruits, provided 
the proper equipment, and led the Dutch intelligence missions in the occupied 
homeland. Other Dutchmen learned intelligence in practice while being active 
in the resistance (De Jong 1979, 837). Although the first postwar service (the 
Bureau of National Security (Bureau Nationale Veiligheid)) was mainly estab-
lished to deal with the consequences of war and occupation, the Central Securi-
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ty Service (Centrale Veiligheidsdienst), established in April 1946, had a much 
wider ambition. The CVD was renamed the Domestic (or internal) Security 
Service: Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst (acronym: BVD) in August 1949 and 
was stocked with more than 600 employees and several millions of guilders as 
an annual budget (Engelen 2010, 59-70).35 
On the methodical and technical front, the security service was best 
equipped to oppose the communist threat. Organizational theory accounts for 
this. Organizations are not neutral and free of values and norms, as we men-
tioned in the introduction; they reflect the normative preferences of the people 
involved in the establishment of the organization. In this case, that was Louis 
Einthoven, head of the respective security services between 1945 and 1961. 
Einthoven designed an organizational structure to know, counter, and neutral-
ize the communist adversary in an offensive way. Some administrative units of 
the BVD for example exactly mirrored the structure of the Communist Party of 
the Netherlands (Engelen 2007, 27-8). 
 Within the BVD the domestic communist threat was the responsibility of 
the ‘B division’ of the security service, which was one of the largest divisions 
of the security service since its inception. Employees of ‘B’, together with 
some other units specialized in the technical and operational facets of intelli-
gence work, collected and analyzed intelligence. The BVD read newspapers, 
pamphlets, magazines, and brochures of organizations, worked with informants 
and agents, sometimes employing microphones to listen in on specific conver-
sations, and copied administrations during so-called surreptitious entry opera-
tions. The BVD thus specialized in and became very good at knowing every 
listed communist in the Netherlands, their backgrounds, plans, and thoughts 
(Engelen 1995, 375; 2000, 40-1). 
In the second half of the 1950s the perceived acuteness and actuality of the 
threat permitted Einthoven to take the fight against communism a step further: 
the BVD added psychological warfare to its intelligence repertoire. Using a 
technique he and his employees learned from the British and the Americans, 
Einthoven introduced a specific form of psychological warfare, ‘divide et im-
pera’. The first of two PSYWAR operations started in 1956, by means of BVD 
officials posing as communist party members, sowing distrust and discord 
within the highest party ranks. In a second operation the BVD established a 
rival communist party of its own, the Socialist Workers’ Party, on 12th July 
1957, in order to distract the CPN in fighting paper tigers and draining energy 
from the communist cadre (Engelen 1995, 218-46). 
                                                             
35  This service existed until 2002, when it was transformed and renamed the General Intelli-
gence and Security Agency (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst), which exists to 
this day. 
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3.4   A Civil Service Fighting a War – Concluding Remarks 
Whereas the Central Intelligence Service observed that all was quiet on the 
communist front in the 1930s, the Second World War changed threat percep-
tions irreversibly. During the war, although communists played an important 
role in the resistance, a ‘repetition of November 18’ was feared by the Dutch 
government in London and resistance fighters alike. The German occupation 
and wartime experience moreover caused widespread anti-totalitarianism. The 
security service used the symbolic and conspiratorial elements of the com-
munist threat to successfully politicize and securitize the threat. In the second 
half of the 1940s, as opposed to the preceding decade, communism seemed to 
become a mass-based phenomenon again. Moreover, the German occupation 
and the role the Dutch right-wing extremist parties had played before the war 
now gave the Dutch communists a very acute and military threatening charac-
ter. Communists in the Netherlands were perceived as a true fifth column. 
Democratic order, even freedom was considered as being under siege, both 
from the outside and from within; not only in the Netherlands, but in the entire 
Western, free world. 
Whilst the prewar security service was the product of neutrality policy and 
thus concentrated on the apolitical referent object of the communist threat, i.e. 
public order, peace, and authority, Einthoven’s security service considered 
communist activities in the light of the new international order after 1945: 
Communism had gained major military and political momentum and threatened 
to undermine the whole free, western world. To prevent this from happening, 
the security service was allowed almost free reign. Einthoven made sure that he 
structured the BVD organization in such a way that his organization was best 
equipped to fight what threatened the free world most: communism. With over 
600 employees, Einthoven was able to professionalize the domestic intelligence 
work and collect substantially more intelligence on the communist adversary 
than ever before. He structured the organization to suit this essentially anti-
communist task and even used psychological warfare operations to break the 
communist strength. Although the BVD was a civilian security service and 
used civilian means, Einthoven perceived himself to be in military combat with 
his communist adversary. Therefore he framed the communist threat in mili-
tary, ideological, and international terms, which legitimized and prioritized his 
endeavors. 
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4.  Communism as an All-Encompassing Threat (1960-1989) 
4.1  A Threat Beyond any Formal Measurement – The Referent 
 Subject 
In the 1960s, history seemed to repeat itself. Just as communism became less of 
an actual, but more of an abstract and potential threat in the 1930s, somewhere 
in the 1960s communism seemed to become less threatening than it had been 
since the Second World War. As the years progressed after the war, Western 
European governments were less and less convinced that a third world war 
would start anytime soon (Van der Boom 2001, 11). Already in the 1950s 
several indications pointed in this direction. In the first place, the Premier of 
the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin, had died in 1953. This led to a temporary and 
mild détente in international relations. Stalin’s successor Nikita Khrushchev 
started a campaign to ‘destalinize’ the Soviet Union and steered towards im-
proving relations with the West. In 1955 the Soviet Union and the United 
States were formally on speaking terms again, at the conference of Geneva 
where they discussed the terms for ending the war in Korea, and other global 
affairs. And in 1956 Khrushchev announced the policy of ‘peaceful coexist-
ence’. Khrushchev claimed that the communist bloc and the West could coexist 
peacefully, without having to destroy or dominate one another (Havenaar 1993, 
122-4). In 1959 Khrushchev and the US president Dwight Eisenhower held 
talks in Camp David, and although the Cuban Crisis of 1962 brought the world 
to the edge of war, soon thereafter international relations changed for the better 
(Hellema 2001, 178). 
Secondly, throughout the 1950s the United States was not the only party 
with nuclear arms any more. American intelligence indicated that the Soviet 
Union conducted successful tests with the H-bomb in 1952 and 1954, demon-
strating that the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal was reaching NATO levels. In 
other words, both parties now had nuclear capabilities and possessed ‘the 
bomb’ (Judt 2005, 273). Within NATO this led to the decision to deploy nucle-
ar weapons on Western European territory. The cabinet of Willem Drees ac-
cepted that NATO could install nuclear missiles on Dutch territory in January 
1958, which was effectuated in 1960 (Hellema 1995, 182-3). This implied that 
future warfare, for which both global power blocs were preparing, would not be 
conventional; it would be nuclear. Although on the one hand, as a Dutch gov-
ernment official remarked in a memorandum, this meant that the sooner the 
enemy was paralyzed the better, many government officials also expected that 
the ‘reciprocity of the expected horrors’ and the ‘mutually assured destruction’ 
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(MAD) would restrain both parties from going to war too quickly.36 Although 
both parties still had to demonstrate their willingness and capability to go to 
war at any moment, in the short term war was becoming less likely (Freedman 
1981, 234; Crozier 1998, 177; Gaddis 2005, 25-7; Traa 2009, 169). In an inter-
nal report the security service observed that the ‘military position’ of both 
parties was ‘stuck’. ‘Humanity’ started to realize that continuing the war was 
impossible without risking ‘self-destruction’.37 
However, for the BVD peaceful coexistence was a farce. Louis Einthoven 
made it clear in his memoirs that he was not going to give credit to Soviet 
leaders like Khrushchev, who had previously threatened Western leaders, say-
ing ‘We will bury you’, or to the head of the intelligence service KGB, An-
dropov, who was overheard saying that ‘peaceful coexistence was a form of 
class struggle’ (Einthoven 1974, 214). The real reason behind the peaceful 
coexistence talks was “probably to spread among the populations the thought 
that maintaining and expanding intensive defense establishments and defense 
instruments would be unnecessary.”38 Nor did the service give credit to the 
apparent tactical move of the Communist Party of the Netherlands in opening 
up to other political parties. For the BVD, this was merely another attempt to 
win support: “a communist party propagating flexibility and compromise 
would exercise the strongest attraction to the masses.”39 
In the eyes of the BVD, therefore, the referent subject of the communist 
threat transformed in three different respects. In the first place, the deceiving 
character of communists came to the fore. As another government agency 
wrote in a memorandum in 1955: if one is “to understand the real meaning of 
the words and deeds of communist leaders, one should not appreciate their 
apparent meaning, but should see them against a background of communist 
struggle which started a hundred years ago and aims at the establishing the 
world communist society.”40 
                                                             
36  National Archive, The Hague, Archive of the Ministries for General Warfare of the Realm 
and General Affairs, and the Cabinet of the Prime Minister, entry 2.03.01, inventory number 
11778, Memorandum Defensie Studiecentrum, How to psychologically prepare the Dutch 
population?, [without date, probably 1955]. 
37  Semi Static Archive of the Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, Memorandum of A. 
Kuipers, Sketch for an effective organization of the service, 1959. 
38  National Archive, The Hague, Archive of the Ministries for General Warfare of the Realm 
and General Affairs, and the Cabinet of the Prime Minister, entry 2.03.01, inventory number 
4735, Memorandum of J. Burger to minister of Interior Affairs, November 1954. 
39  National Archive, The Hague, Archive of the Ministries for General Warfare of the Realm 
and General Affairs, and the Cabinet of the Prime Minister, entry 2.03.01, inventory number 
4735, Letter of the Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst to the Vaste Kamercommissie voor de 
Controle op de Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst, The political direction of the Communis-
tische Partij Nederland after the session of the party leadership, 17th November 1955. 
40  National Archive, The Hague, Archive of the Ministries for General Warfare of the Realm 
and General Affairs, and the Cabinet of the Prime Minister, entry 2.03.01, inventory number 
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Secondly, the scope and size of the communist problem had expanded im-
mensely. From a short-term, military, and imminent threat, communism had 
transformed into a long-term, enduring enemy which attempted to undermine 
the West with all means and tactics. In a report in which the security service 
informed parliament on the anticommunist security measures in the United 
States, an American statesman was approvingly cited saying that ‘the strength 
of the communist party is beyond any formal measurement’. Even if the mem-
bership numbers of communist organizations went down, their potential for 
mobilizing support gave the communists an aura of everlasting potential.41 
Thirdly, this led the BVD to persist in interpreting the communist threat in 
ideological terms which resulted in an almost metaphysical threat perception. 
Even when the CPN severed all ties with Moscow and announced its policy of 
autonomy (1963-1977) – the CPN refused to choose between China and Mos-
cow – the service still saw the CPN as the manifestation of a global communist 
network, commanded by Moscow. For the security service, the direct connec-
tions between a foreign power and a political party were the main reason for a 
continued focus on Dutch communism, because of the omnipresent possibility 
of another regime interfering in domestic politics. Although these ties were cut, 
this did not lead the security service to conclude that Dutch communists be-
came less threatening. “Communism changed in some respects, but until now 
its essence has not,” the head of service Sinninghe Damsté warned to the minis-
ter of interior affairs in 1967. The symbolic character prevailed: as long as 
communist parties were around, they were potentially dangerous.42 
4.2   Manipulation in the Political Arena – The Referent Object 
The referent object of a global communist conspiracy remained in essence the 
same. Western democracy, culture, and freedom were at stake. Only the dimen-
sions and domains in which to expect communist conspiratorial activities to 
erupt changed, according to the Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst. On the one 
hand, the threat became less tangible and therefore it became more difficult to 
ascertain how the Dutch communists would try to attain their goals. On the 
other hand, it had become clear that communist activities had shifted from 
presenting a military threat to becoming a menace on the political and psycho-
logical front. In the eyes of the BVD the Soviet Union had merely decided that 
“military aggression was not a suitable method in these times.” It nevertheless 
                                                                                                                                
11778, Memorandum of the Bijzondere Voorlichtingscommissie on the Cold War and psy-
chological warfare, November 1955. 
41  National Archive, The Hague, Archive of the House of Representatives, entry 2.02.28, inven-
tory number 4735. Some remarks on communism in the United States and the fight against 
communism. 
42  Semi Static Archive of the Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, Report of meeting 
between head of the BVD and the minister of Interior Affairs, 8th June 1967. 
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continued to avail itself of every other thinkable method short of war to expand 
its power position in the world, according to the head of the security service 
(Einthoven 1974, 214).43 
Communist influence was now less tangible, so in addition to looking for 
saboteurs in the governmental apparatuses, the security service focused on 
more refined ways of influence.44 One of the well-tried tactics the communists 
used, for example, was to infiltrate or manipulate existing political parties and 
organizations in order to gain influence and maybe steer them into a more 
procommunist course. The security service therefore maintained close contact 
with the leaders of political parties, unions, and other societal institutions to 
monitor whether they had communists in their ranks. In fact, the CPN did at-
tempt to infiltrate various youth organizations in the 1970s, and they were very 
influential in the pacifist movement and in the organizations opposing nuclear 
armament in the late 1970s and early 1980s.45 To a certain extent, the BVD was 
right in suspecting illicit interference of a communist country, for example the 
German Democratic Republic, in domestic political affairs (De Graaf 2004, 
90-6). 
4.3   Fighting Communism in a Much More Antagonistic 
 Environment – The Response 
Because the security service perceived communism as a perennial, unchanging 
threat, it did not feel the necessity of adapting its own security logics either. It 
still aspired to know who the communists were and what they did. Although 
other threatening groups such as student activists and terrorists increasingly 
demanded the attention of the BVD, the service continued to keep its eyes and 
ears fixed on the members of the Communist Party of the Netherlands, their 
internal discussions, and their political plans. Even when a growing anti-
anticommunist political and societal environment induced the BVD to adapt 
and accommodate its anticommunist threat perceptions, despite several internal 
discussions the BVD continued to frame the threat in an almost metaphysical 
and highly ideological way. 
This was exemplified when Minister of Interior Affairs Ed van Thijn tried to 
end the interference of the Dutch security service BVD in the CPN. In response 
the head of the security service Pieter de Haan defended the view that it was 
not ‘the entire communist party’ that was considered a threat, but certain indi-
                                                             
43  National Archive, The Hague, Archive of the Ministries for General Warfare of the Realm 
and General Affairs, and the Cabinet of the Prime Minister, entry 2.03.01, inventory number 
11930; BVD contribution to a report from the Comité Verenigde Inlichtingendiensten Ne-
derland, 10th May 1958. 
44  Semi Static Archive of the Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, Memorandum of A. 
Kuipers, Sketch for an effective organization of the service, 1959. 
45  Proceedings of the House of Representatives, sessions 1979-1980, Document number 15936. 
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viduals and certain political goals of the organization. This was called ‘the 
aspect approach’. Because Van Thijn soon afterwards had to step down and 
gave way to a more negligent minister, the security service was able to contin-
ue its operations against the Dutch communists until 1987, when it was decided 
that the operational activities in the CPN should be terminated (Vos 2004, 36-
7; Engelen 2007, 234-5). 
4.4   Potentially, But All Around – Concluding Remarks 
Due to a détente in international relations and the fact that both parties pos-
sessed nuclear weapons, the actual and imminent characteristics of the com-
munist threat changed. It became less probable that war would break out in the 
short term. This would suggest that the security service would adapt its military 
and ideological interpretation of the Dutch communist organizations. However, 
the BVD did not. Although an internal report remarked that the political do-
main would probably become more important, there was no attempt to ‘desecu-
ritize’ the communist threat and to redirect intelligence resources elsewhere. 
The security service thus expressed confidently that the ‘peaceful coexist-
ence’ was a farce and that the proclaimed autonomy of the Communist Party of 
the Netherlands was a tactical maneuver as well. Indeed, instead of becoming 
less threatening, communism gained even larger threatening proportions. For 
the BVD, it was clear that the communists were saying different things from 
what they were actually doing. Therefore their plans became even more subtle, 
unknowable, and secretive and thus it became increasingly difficult to know 
when and where communists would become active. 
We could argue that on the one hand, symbolism exercised an important in-
fluence in this period. Given the alleged unchanging nature of the communist 
ideology, the security service kept on interpreting what the communists did in 
the light of their original, Marxist-Leninist aim to start a revolution and bring 
down existing governments. Despite their limited capabilities for actually stag-
ing such a coup, its presence made communist parties an unchanging potential 
threat. On the other hand, mechanisms of cognitive bias accounted for this. As 
long as this symbolic enemy was present, the security service thought it was 
relevant to obtain knowledge about what was going on in the Communist Party 
of the Netherlands; through the years it had obtained an extensive base of 
knowledge about the communist adversary, so that every new bit of infor-
mation confirmed the unchanging communist potential for world revolution. 
‘Beginning from the known’ was always the directory of intelligence work. 
Confirming that communism was threatening was the essential way the BVD 
gathered intelligence. The service did not try to find any information that inval-
idated this presupposition (De Valk 1996, 11, 44; Engelen 2007, 44). 
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5.  The Perpetual Adversary 
Let us turn once more to the former employee of the BVD in the introduction 
of this article, who called the disintegration of the Soviet Union a cunning plot. 
It was seemingly impossible for the Dutch security services to let go of its 
existential adversary and conceive communism as ‘not threatening any more’ 
and to scale back its organizational efforts vis-à-vis communism on its own 
account, despite – for example in the 1930s – the observation that communism 
had become less of a threat. Only late in the 1980s through political interfer-
ence did the BVD end its operational activities in Dutch communist organiza-
tions. To account for this, instead of ascertaining that the security service was 
an inward-looking organization, we departed from this observation and pro-
posed the use of insights from securitization and organization theory and intel-
ligence studies to scrutinize the threat perceptions of the Dutch security ser-
vices. We discerned the referent subject and object of the threat and the 
security measures in the domestic intelligence domain in three different periods 
of time (1918-1940, 1940-1960, and 1960-1989) to gain insight into the dy-
namics with which the threat perceptions of the security services took shape. 
Looking over this entire period, we understand that the symbolic nature of 
the communist threat dominated the referent subject and object of the threat 
perceptions. Symbolism, as we said in the introduction, implies that something 
by definition refers to something other than itself. Since the revolutionary au-
tumn of 1918, Dutch communism represented not what it actually did, but 
always what it might do, according to its ideology (world communism) and its 
ties with a foreign power (the Soviet Union). Until the beginning of the 1920s 
the Central Intelligence Service most importantly feared that communist agita-
tion would spill over from Germany and thus encourage Dutch communists to 
scale up their aspirations. Although nothing happened and Dutch communism 
ceased to be as threatening as before because support decreased (only some 
intellectuals still bothered), the Dutch communist organizations remained an 
object of the security services’ attention. 
Through the Second World War, communism became more threatening than 
ever before. This war had shown how threatening totalitarianism actually was 
and this put Dutch communism in a new perspective. Stalin now appeared to 
strive for world domination and in the light of this increasing external threat, 
the domestic communists transformed into a fifth column: an actual, military 
and acute political threat, aiming to undermine the political system, the eco-
nomic order, and the government apparatus. The referent object switched from 
public order and authority to Dutch national security and that of the free world 
as a whole, united in the military alliance of NATO. The actual communist 
supportive base seemed greater than ever.  
After Stalin’s death in 1953 and more clearly after the Cuban missile crisis 
of 1962, détente set in. Military aggression by the Soviet Union became less 
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likely, since both power blocs disposed of nuclear weaponry. Dutch com-
munists transformed from an acute military into a less tangible, political, and 
psychological threat. The referent subject and object became increasingly 
vague and abstract. But although its shape might have changed, the BVD ar-
gued, its essence had not. The communist menace was still a menace. Peaceful 
coexistence was a farce and although it was practically inconceivable that the 
CPN was capable of staging a revolution, the BVD continued to interpret the 
activities of the Dutch communist organizations.  
To understand this, we have to recognize the powerful symbols in the com-
munist threat. Although the conspiratorial character remained essentially the 
same, due to the perceived essentialism attribute given to the communist ideol-
ogy, the employment of this symbolic significance varied over time. Refer-
ences to their potential threatening character increased in the security services’ 
reports whenever the vivid memory of past threats started to dissolve, which 
happened in the 1930s and from the 1960s on. During these periods the sym-
bolic elements, i.e. the references to the ideology and conspiratorial nature of 
communism, emerged more frequently in the reports of the security services. 
The exact object of the threat and the timeframe became increasingly vague in 
these periods. 
To explain this in securitization terms, the communist threat was never 
desecuritized, i.e. never pushed into the domain of normal politics. Neither the 
referent subject nor the referent object of the communist threat changed in such 
a way that the security service considered it no longer necessary to monitor it. 
When changes occurred, the rationalizations and depictions of the communist 
threat changed, but the responses were never a decrease in efforts. These re-
mained the same or increased throughout the entire period. Communism was 
never considered part of the ‘normal’, or bona fide political domain. 
Besides this, ‘cognitive closure’ and organizational theory help to account 
for this. From the Second World War on, ‘beginning from the known’ was the 
leading intelligence principle. All intelligence gathered on the Dutch com-
munist organizations since then confirmed the same thing: communism was 
dangerous. Every mutation, utterance, thought, in fact even trivial fact that was 
related to the communist threat obtained significance because of this mecha-
nism. All new information confirmed the threatening character of Dutch com-
munism, pointing to past experiences and timeless, metaphysical threat percep-
tions, rather than to actual political developments. 
These inward-oriented and closed threat assessments were caused by the in-
stitutionalization of the domestic intelligence function. Louis Einthoven struc-
tured the postwar security services in such a way that the services were best 
equipped to oppose communism. The security services specialized in methods 
and techniques, which they refined year in year out, to gather intelligence on 
extremist organizations and individuals. They kept doing so, because they were 
good at that. Moreover, the service’s resources profited highly from this threat 
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perception. This might explain the interest of the security service in holding 
onto its traditional adversary until far into the 1980s. Only when the organiza-
tion was fundamentally transformed and the political establishment demanded 
change was the well-known communist adversary let go. 
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